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RECENT DECISIONS
The Court's expansion of the term "transferable" was a natural
corollary to its freeing of the term "property." The same technical dis-
tinctions that had restricted "property" would have reappeared in a
limited definition of "transferable" (i.e., it may now be property, but
it still is not transferable) to defeat the purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act. The only real limitations within section 70a(5)37 now appear to
be whether or not the interest is one sufficiently connected with the
bankrupt's future and his ability to make a fresh start, and whatever
limits the equity courts of a particular state may apply.38
BRuCE C. O'NEILL
Municipal Corporations: The Rule of Reason As Applied to
Annexations-In Village of Elmwood Park v. City of Racine,' the
village of Elmwood Park sought a reversal of the judgment of the
circuit court dismissing its petition for annexation to the town of Mt.
Pleasant. Elmwood Park was incorporated as a village in 1960 and
has an area of approximately 103.51 acres and a population of 432.
Mt. Pleasant, which was to be annexed, has an area of approximately
22,810 acres and a population of 12,023. Both Elmwood Park and Mt.
Pleasant border on the city of Racine and receive many of their gov-
ernmental services under contract from Racine. Apparently out of fear
of continued loss of territory to the city, Mt. Pleasant sought to merge
with Elmwood Park and they worked out an agreement to accomplish
that purpose.
In order to carry out the proposed merger, Mt. Pleasant and Elm-
wood Park had a choice of proceeding under either the consolidation
statute, section 66.02, or the annexation statute, section 66.024. The
consolidation statute sets forth a procedure for consolidating any town,
village or city with a continguous town, village or city. Generally, the
procedure calls for an ordinance to be passed by a two-thirds vote of
each board or council and by a majority of votes in each municipality
to withholdings from wages thereafter is the property of the bankrupt." 3
REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, §1211.11 (Supp. 1966). That the exact refund may
not be determined or claimed until the end of the taxable year would make no
difference as the United States Supreme Court has now established.
37 That there are substantial limitations on §70(a) (5) from without, see note
16 supra.35 In Wisconsin, future interests, whether vested or contingent, are alienable at
law. Wis. STATS. §§230.07-..13, 230.35 (1963). That this applies to future inter-
ests in both realty and personalty, see Meyer v. Reif, 217 Wis. 11, 16-18, 258
N.W. 391, 393-94 (1935) and Estate of Tantillo, 24 Wis. 2d 19, 22, 127 N.W.
2d 798, 800 (1964).
An expectancy may not be assigned at law, however, such assignment, if sus-
tained by a sufficient consideration, will be enforced in equity. Hofmeister v.
Hunter, 230 Wis. 81, 88, 283 N.W. 330, 333 (1939). Thus it would seem the
claim for a loss-carryback tax refund of a Wisconsin bankrupt would also vest
in the trustee in bankruptcy.
'Village of Elmwood Park v. City of Racine, 29 Wis. 2d 400, 139 N.W. 2d
2d 66 (1966).
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on a consolidation referendum, if the ordinance is to have the effect of
a contract between the municipalities. Before the referendum can be
held, the consolidation ordinance must be submitted to the circuit
court for a determination of whether all the formal requirements of
the statute have been met. If these requirements are met, the court is
to refer the matter to the director of the planning function of the de-
partment of resource development so that he may determine if the
proposed consolidation is in the public interest. If the director ap-
proves of the consolidation, the petition for consolidation shall be
granted and the consolidation referendum held.2
The significant difference between the consolidation procedure and
the annexation procedure of section 66.024 is that the latter doesn't pro-
vide for the public interest determination required under section 66.02,
but rather that a majority vote on the referendum for annexation
determines whether or not the annexatiQn is valid. In fact, an attempt
to amend section 66.024 to provide for a public interest determination
failed to pass one house of the legislature.3 The annexation procedure
of section 66.024 is intended to be a complete alternative to any other
annexation procedure.
Faced with the option of using either section 66.02 or section 66.024,
the municipalities of Mt. Pleasant and Elmwood Park chose to proceed
under section 66.024. Since the municipality which would result from
the merger would have had a small population in a large area and be
dependent on the city of Racine for governmental services, the reason
for the election to use section 66.024 was to avoid an unfavorable de-
termination by the director of resource development, which would have
prevented a consolidation if the proceeding had been under section
66.02.
However, the circuit court dismissed the petition for annexation on
the grounds that the petition was actually a consolidation proceeding
and that the requirements of the consolidation statute, section 66.02,
had not been met. Furthermore, even if the attempt to merge Mt.
Pleasant and Elmwood Park was properly an annexation proceeding
under section 66.024, the circuit court felt that the proposed annexation
was invalid under the "rule of reason."
On appeal, counsel for the village contended that the use of the
procedure outlined in section 66.024 had been proper, that no size
limitation could be read into the statute and that the legislature had
not intended that the rule of reason should be applied by the courts in
determining the validity of an annexation proceeding under this statute.
They felt that the intent of the legislature was to provide a method
2 Wis. STAT. §66.014(9) (e), (1963).
3 Bill No. 1019A., to make these standards applicable to section 66.024 was
passed by the assembly on Dec. 23, 1959 (Journal of Assembly p. 2855) but
was nonconcurred by the Senate. (Senate Journal p. 2301).
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whereby those who live in a disputed territory could choose their gov-
ernment by a referendum rather than by having a government imposed
upon them in the public interest.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with the appellants that
section 66.024 was intended to be a complete alternative to any other
annexation procedure. Therefore, even though they could have pro-
ceeded under section 66.02, it had been entirely proper for Mt. Pleasant
and Elmwood Park to apply the annexation procedure to the attempted
merger. However, the court felt that the rule of reason does apply to
an annexation under section 66.024 and that the annexation must satis-
fy the requirements of the statute and of the case law dealing with
annexation. Proposed annexations therefore are governed by the rule
of reason. In the Elmwood Park opinion a list of Wisconsin cities stat-
ing the rule of reason in terms of reasonableness are enumerated. For
example, Town of Fond du Lac v. City of Fond du Lac :4
The question is not whether the city can have only one con-
tinuous boundary line but whether the proposed boundary lines
are reasonable in the sense that they were not fixed arbitrarily,
capriciously, or in the abuse of discretion.5
However, in the Elmwood Park case, the court emphasizes the idea
that a need for an annexation must be shown, if the annexation is to
be upheld:
We are convinced Elmwood has no reasonable basis to annex
Mount Pleasant. It is clear that there is no present need, or
any reasonably expectable future needs, based upon the rate of
growth of Elmwood, that would reasonably justify Elmwood
annexing 35.64 square miles of territory, to wit, the entire town
of Mount Pleasant.6
Another illustration of this emphasis on the importance of showing a
need for the annexation is found in the statement dismissing the
petition:
Without a showing of some reasonable need, the proceeding, in
legal parlance, is arbitrary and capricious, and contrary to the
rule of reason. The petition for an annexation referendum
must be dismissed.7
It would appear that the court is adding the requirement of a showing
of need for an annexation in addition to a showing of reasonableness
if the annexation is to be approved. The situation in the Elmwood Park
case involved a small village annexing an entire township. The petition
422 Wis. 2d 533, 126 N.W. 2d 201 (1964).5 Id. at 541, 126 N.W. 2d at 205.6 Village of Elmwood Park v .City of Racine, supra note 1, at 411, 139 N.W.
2d at 71.
7Village of Elmwood Park v. City of Racine, supra note 1, at 413, 139 N.W.2d at 72.
1966]
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for annexation could have easily been dismissed on the basis of reason-
ableness, as the court has done in similar cases.8 For example, as was
done in Mt. Pleasant v. Racine:9
The question is not whether a city can have only one continuous
boundary line, but whether the proposed boundary lines are
reasonable in the sense that they were not fixed arbitrarily,
capriciously, or in the abuse of discretion. 10
Assuming that the showing of need is an added requirement to the rule
of reason, the question is what exactly is meant by that term.
One possible explanation of the Elmwood Park decision would be
that the court intended to qualify need to mean that there must only
be a showing of reasonable need. A similar question of interpretation
arose in an opinion dealing with the application of the rule of reason
to the incorporation of a village."' In applying the rule of reason to that
situation the court said:
If it is proposed to include rural or agricultural lands that are
sparsely settled, and that have not the distinctive characteristics
of a village, and have no natural connection therewith, and
which do not seem to be reasonably appurtenant and necessary
for the future growth of the village, then the uniformity of
town and county government guaranteed by the constitution is
invaded under the decision of this court in State ex rel Holland
v. Lammers, 113 Wis. 398, 86 N.W. 677, 89 N.W. 501.12
When the court applied the rule of reason to a later case it noted
that this language could have been misread to mean restricting land to
be included within corporate limits to such as was plainly necessary
to the village, but instead the court interpreted this language to mean
that "'reasonably' was intended to qualify the word 'necessary' as
well as 'appurtenant.' "13 Therefore the standard to be applied is what
is "reasonably necessary." This interpretation could be applied to the
use of the term "need" in the Elmwaod Park decision. Also, it would
seem unlikely that the court would require an absolute showing of
need in addition to a showing of reasonableness, although this would
be a possibility.
Even if the court meant a showing of reasonable need, this term
has not been defined. Since the standard was not stated in this case in
terms of reasonableness alone, as it has been in decisions dealing with
consolidations under section 66.02,14 it would appear that a different
8 Wilson v. Sheboygan, 230 Wis. 483, 494-495, 283 N.W. 312, 318 (1939) ; Green-
field v. Milwaukee, 273 Wis. 484, 78 N.W. 2d 909 (1956); Town of Fond
du Lac v. City of Fond du Lac, 22 Wis. 2d 533, 126 N.W. 2d 201 (1964).
9 24 Wis. 2d 41 127 N.W. 2d 757 (1964).
aId. at 46, 127 .W. 2d at 760.
11 Fenton v. Ryan, 140 Wis. 353, 122 N.W. 756 (1909).
12 Id. at 359, 122 N.W. at 758.
131ncorporation of Village of Biron, 146 Wis. 444, 451, 131 N.W. 829, 831 (1911).
14 Town of Fond du Lac v. City of Fond du Lac, 22 Wis. 2d 533, 126 N.W. 2d
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standard will be applied in determining whether or not a petition under
section 66.024 will be dismissed. Apparently, if a municipality pro-
ceeds under this section rather than section 66.02, some sort of need
for the area to be annexed will have to be shown, in effect as an al-
ternative to the public interest determination required by section 66.02.
In view of the uncertainty as to the meaning of "need" a municipality
would probably be very reluctant to use the annexation procedure of
section 66.024 and would use the consolidation procedure whenever
possible.
Another possible meaning of the term would be that a determination
of the public interest as a whole in the annexation must be made. A
requirement of a determination of the public interest is expressly in-
corporated in the consolidation statute, section 66.02, and the court
has applied the rule of reason to this statute. 5 The same requirements
of reasonableness, in the sense of not being arbitrary or capricious
and also of being in the public interest, could logically be applied to
annexation under section 66.024. Recognition of the public interest can
be found in the quotations from other jurisdictions that are included
in the Elmwood Park decision, for instance:
And the question of reasonableness is one on the entirety of the
attempted annexation, so that an annexation cannot necessarily
be said to have had a reasonable basis merely because a sound
reason may exist for taking in some particular part of the ter-
ritory.26
This interpretation of the word "need" to mean that an annexation
must be in the public interest would seem to be the most likely inter-
pretation. The legislature has already recognized the importance of
making this determination by including the requirement that proposed
consolidations be submitted to the director of the planning function of
the department of resource development. Also, the continued growth
of urban areas and the need for a sufficient tax base to allow city
governments to provide necessary governmental services to the sur-
rounding area would favor this interpretation. However, so long as
there is ambiguity as to the meaning of the term "need", municipalities
will be very reluctant to proceed under section 66.024.
C. MICHAEL CONTER
PROBATE: The "Party in Interest" Concepts-In 1948 Ray E.
Helgert executed a simple will by which he left his entire estate to his
two sisters, Rose and Mary Helgert. On February 15, 1963, exactly one
201 (1964) ; Town of Mt. Pleasant v. City of Racme, 24 Wis. 2d 41, 127 N.W.
2d 757 (1964).
'5 Ibid.
16 City of Sugar Creek v. Standard Oil Company, 163 F. 2d 320, 324 (8th Cir.
1947).
